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Two’s a Crowd: 
Women Candidates in Concurrent Elections 
 
 While their numbers are slowly rising, women are still seriously under-represented in public 
office. Women make up over 50% of the population yet, at the national level, comprise only 19% of the 
House of Representatives and 20% of the Senate. At the state level, 6 of 50 governors are female, and 
women make up approximately 25% of state legislatures.1 While these statistics speak for themselves, it 
is still unclear exactly why these gender disparities exist. Some scholars point to structural barriers to 
explain this phenomenon, such as the composition of electoral districts (Palmer and Simon 2008) and the 
role of political parties as gatekeepers (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Others find evidence that women are less 
likely than men to express political ambition or run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005; 2010). At the same 
time, the literature is divided on the influence of voters’ attitudes about women. It is generally found that 
“when women run, women win;” in other words, women candidates are often just as likely to win a given 
election as are their male counterparts (e.g. Seltzer, Newman and Leighton 1997). On the other hand, 
gender-based stereotypes and assumptions about women’s traditional roles may lead voters to doubt 
women’s ability as leaders (e.g. Eagley and Karau 2002; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and 
Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1996; Leeper 1991; though several newer studies dispute the continued 
importance of these stereotypes in electoral outcomes [e.g. Brooks 2013, Dolan 2014]).  
 To our knowledge, all of this research on voters’ attitudes toward women candidates and electoral 
outcomes has considered single elections in isolation (one notable exception is Wolak 2009). Importantly, 
though, the US is unique in the sheer number of offices that can appear on the ballot at any given time. 
On Election Day, voters are often asked to choose candidates in multiple contests at the national, state and 
local levels. For each office on the ballot, voters are faced with multiple candidates, each providing 
information about him/herself and his/her beliefs (as well as negative information about his/her 
 
1 All statistics taken from the Center from American Women and Politics (www.cawp.rutgers.edu) 
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competitors). This creates a complicated political environment that voters must navigate. Amidst all of 
this competing information, decisions about whom to vote for in each race are likely influenced by the 
larger electoral context.  
Specifically, we posit that the fate of women candidates may be affected by the number of 
women running in other, concurrent races. The increasing visibility and acceptability of women in public 
office may mean that doubts about women as leaders may not necessarily play an obvious role in one 
isolated race, but what happens when voters are faced with the possibility of voting women candidates 
into multiple offices simultaneously? If the “default” American politician is still male and assumptions 
about women cast doubt on their leadership potential, voters may be uncomfortable with the prospect of 
voting for women in multiple offices at the same time. Indeed, a recent article by Hennings and Urbatsch 
(2015) finds that party elites are unlikely to nominate multiple women on the same ticket so that men at 
the top of a ticket can have running mates of either gender, but women at the top of a ticket are far more 
likely to have a male running mate. Hennings and Urbatsch posit that at least part of the reason for this is 
that party officials assume that an all-female ticket will be less electable than one in which a man also 
appears. Essentially, we seek to determine the extent to which party officials’ assumptions are well-
founded. Are voters less likely to support a woman for office when asked to consider voting for other 
women simultaneously? 
 This paper will utilize two computer-based experiments using the Dynamic Process Tracing 
Environment (DPTE)2 to explore whether and how the overall gender composition of an election cycle 
affects women candidates’ evaluations and election outcomes. We use DPTE to vary systematically the 
number of women running for office in a single campaign season. DPTE allows subjects to experience a 
simulated “campaign” and election featuring invented but realistic candidates. Subjects experience a 
constant “flow” of information about the candidates, allowing them to learn whatever they want about the 
 
2 Developed with aid from the National Science Foundation by Richard R. Lau and David Redlawsk. The 
software is available at www.processtracing.org. 
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particular candidates in the races, and mimicking the complex information environment that often exists 
during a campaign season. We find a consistent pattern across both experiments in which female 
candidates are not adversely affected when they are the only woman that voters see, but they are 
disadvantaged when other women appear on the same party’s ballot in other races. Further, this pattern is 
stronger for women in lower offices, such that women running for the House of Representatives are more 
disadvantaged than are women running for president, Senate, or governor.     
Gender and Voting 
 Research on the question of whether gender affects female candidates’ chances at the ballot box 
has produced mixed findings. A large literature exists examining the nature and effects of gender-based 
stereotypes on the fates of women candidates, and much early work in this area found compelling 
evidence that women candidates were subject to stereotypes based on their gender. In particular, much of 
this early evidence suggests that female candidates are often assumed to have more feminine and 
communal characteristics like compassion and trustworthiness and fewer agentic traits, such as 
competence and leadership, and that these stereotypes can lead to a disadvantage for female candidates in 
terms of vote choice and candidate evaluations (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1996; Leeper 1991; 
Kahn 1996). However, other work has found evidence that prejudice against women in the electorate is no 
longer a major obstacle to women candidates (Burrell 1994, Seltzer, Newman and Leighton 1997, Darcy, 
et al 1994, Woods 2000, Dolan 2004), and more recent studies have found evidence that gender 
stereotypes may not play a major role in voters’ evaluations of women candidates, particularly when other 
politically-salient cues like political party are taken into account (Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; Hayes 2011). 
These findings may be a sign that gender-based evaluations are less important than they once were, or it 
may mean that gender cues are influential in some contexts, but not others. 
Indeed, some scholars have found evidence that certain aspects of the political environment can 
make gender more or less salient to voters. For example, when “feminine,” domestic issues are at the 
forefront of the public’s policy agenda, women may do better, while they are disadvantaged when issues 
like war, terrorism and the economy are primary (Cook, Wilcox and Thomas 1994, Dolan 2004, Lawless 
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2004; Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister 2011). Further, women appear to be at a disadvantage when 
running for higher-level, executive offices and may have to downplay their gender when vying for such 
offices (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Lau, et al 2011). There is also evidence that gender stereotypes may 
only affect evaluations of women candidates when stereotypes are activated through campaign messages 
(Bauer 2014) and that a female candidate’s political party can influence whether and how gender 
stereotypes are applied (Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Huddy and Capelos 2002).  
There is also reason to believe that women in leadership roles (like political candidates and 
office-holders) may be subject to particular kinds of stereotypes that may not apply to all women. In 
particular, assumptions that women are higher in communal traits, such as compassion, kindness, 
sensitivity, and nurturing, while men are ascribed more agentic traits, like assertiveness, ambition, 
dominance, etc. (Eagly 1987), can lead people to doubt women’s leadership capabilities. Role Congruity 
Theory (Eagly and Karau 2002) posits that traditionally feminine roles and common assumptions about 
women based on those roles are incompatible with notions of what it takes to be an effective leader. 
Further, Schneider and Bos (2013) find evidence that female candidates are stereotyped as female 
candidates, per se; that is, as a sub-type of women. They also find that women candidates may be 
particularly vulnerable when evaluated on masculine and leadership characteristics such as strength and 
competence. Finally, two Dynamic Process Tracing studies have examined the role of candidate gender in 
subjects’ information search patterns and find that stereotypes related to competence can be particularly 
influential for women candidates, depending on the substantive information available about them. First, 
Ditonto, Hamilton and Redlawsk (2014) find that a candidate’s gender affects the kind of information that 
voters seek out about that candidate, which can, in turn, influence vote choice. In particular, subjects seek 
out more information related to a female candidate’s competence and qualifications than they do for male 
candidates. Similarly, Ditonto (2016) finds that women candidates who are portrayed as competent fare 
just as well as male candidates, but that women are more vulnerable to information that casts doubt on 
their competence than are men. 
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Another aspect of the political context that may influence the extent to which a candidate’s 
gender matters, and that has not yet been considered, is the gender composition of all of the races being 
contested at a given time. If voters still harbor doubts about women as political leaders, they may be able 
to use politically relevant information to overcome those doubts in individual races, especially races in 
which the candidates are well known. However, because of the underlying assumption that female gender 
roles and leadership roles are incongruent (e.g. Eagly and Karau 2002, Schneider and Bos 2014), and 
therefore male politicians are still considered “normal,” voters may be less comfortable voting for 
multiple women at once. Concerns about women's leadership ability may compound as more women 
enter the electoral context, making it difficult for individuals who (consciously or unconsciously) 
overcome stereotypes and biases for isolated women candidates to do so when they must evaluate 
multiple women simultaneously.  
The concept of expectancy violation (e.g. Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton and Mulholland 
1997) suggests that evaluations of out-group members who violate stereotypic expectations in a positive 
way may receive exaggeratedly positive evaluations when compared to in-group members with the same 
traits. The fact that a woman has made it to a general election contest for a high-level political office, 
then, may be a cue that this individual woman is “special,” or is an exception to any stereotypic 
expectations that voters may have about women being ineffective leaders. A single female candidate may 
be seen as an atypical “exemplar” of women leaders, thereby preventing her from being categorized with 
the larger group of women leaders and any stereotypes that accompany it (Bless, Schwarz, Bodenhausen 
and Thiel 2000). On the other hand, seeing multiple women running for office at the same time may 
instead override any expectancy violation for individual candidates and simply cue the negative 
stereotypes that accompany women in leadership roles as a group.  Just as Hennings and Urbatsch (2015) 
find a limit on the number of women that party officials will run on the same ticket, then, we expect that 
there may be a similar “ceiling effect” for the number of women a particular voter may be willing to cast 
a vote for.  
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We also expect that gender may matter more for the candidates that voters know the least about. 
Gender cues serve as proxies for other information. Because stereotypic information is more salient when 
less individuating information is incorporated into a person judgment (Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, and 
Hepburn 1980; Locksley, Hepburn and Ortiz 1982; Ashmore 1981; Eagly and Wood 1982), our best 
chance to observe the effect of such cues may be in offices where voters are least likely to learn much 
specific information about the candidates (and thus are less likely to counteract stereotypes/prejudices). 
Congressional candidates have the lowest average campaign spending and lowest recognition among the 
major offices and voters tend to spend less effort and attention in learning about congressional candidates 
than higher-office candidates. Therefore, it may be that the effects of multiple concurrent female 
candidates will be stronger for congressional candidates, relative to candidates for president, governor or 
Senate. 
On the other hand, women are more likely to serve in office at lower levels—women currently 
comprise about 20% of Congress, but there has never been a female president, e.g.—so it is also possible 
that gender will matter more to voters when they are considering higher offices that they care more about, 
and that Role Congruency Theory will be more salient at these higher levels. Indeed, some experimental 
evidence also suggests that women candidates do worst when running for high-level and executive offices 
(Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Women who “shatter the glass ceiling” may be more strongly scrutinized 
than those competing for offices where women candidates have won before, leading to gender cues 
becoming prioritized over alternative information. Rather than speculate on which of these claims is 
stronger, we leave it to an empirical test of the data. 
Hypotheses 
To sum up our main hypotheses, we expect to see that the number of women running 
concurrently in different elections will affect the electoral fates of those women. We believe that most 
Americans care predominantly about political party and other politically relevant characteristics when 
evaluating candidates, and that the effects of gender may or may not be visible in any single race 
considered in isolation. However, as more women run for office at the same time, we expect that gender 
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cues will begin to have a larger effect on evaluations of women candidates, and that the effects of gender 
will become more pronounced. We examine these expectations within a subject’s preferred political party 
in order to examine the effects of an overall election’s gender composition on candidates that voters will 
actually consider voting for (i.e. for out-party candidates, voters already largely dismiss them and 
negative evaluations likely hit a floor effect). Thus: 
H1: When one female candidate runs within a voter’s preferred party, and no other female 
candidates appear on the ballot, any negative effects of gender should be small or nonexistent, 
mirroring findings from recent studies that political party cues will drown out concerns about 
gender. 
H2: When a female candidate runs within a voter’s preferred party, and other in-party women 
candidates appear elsewhere on the ballot, she will be evaluated more negatively and will have a 
lower likelihood of obtaining a subject’s vote. The greater the number of in-party women 
appearing in other races, the worse she will do. 
We also have competing expectations as to whether these effects will be most prominent among 
candidates competing for lower office, about which voters presumably know and care less, or among 
candidates running for higher office, where women have tended to serve least often and where negative 
stereotypes may be most applicable. So, we expect to find evidence of either H3 or H4: 
H3. The negative effects of the presence of multiple female candidates will be most pronounced 
for women running in for the House of Representatives, since stereotypes are applied more 
readily when less individuating information is available and subjects should care more/seek out 
more information about higher-level candidates. Feeling thermometer ratings will be lower for 
women House candidates who appear alongside other women, and their likelihood of receiving a 
subject’s vote will also be lower.  
H4: Alternatively, because voters tend to care more about high level offices, such as the 
presidency, they may be least comfortable voting for women in these races. If doubts about 
women in leadership roles are most prevalent in high-level and executive contexts, as some prior 
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evidence suggests, we would expect female presidential candidates who appear alongside other 
women candidates to receive lower feeling thermometer scores and have a lower likelihood of 
winning people’s votes than those who appear without other women on the ballot.  
Dynamic Process Tracing 
To test our hypotheses, we run two computer-based experiments using dynamic process tracing. 
DPTE has been described in detail elsewhere (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; 2006; Redlawsk & Lau, 2013) so 
this description will be brief. Process tracing presents subjects with an abundance of information related 
to a number of alternatives (in this case, realistic yet fictitious candidates) and allows researchers to 
follow a subject’s choices as s/he examines whatever information s/he chooses. These experiments are 
“dynamic” because participants face an ever-changing information environment that mimics the ebb and 
flow of a real-world election campaign.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
DPTE campaigns include the kinds of information that voters might expect to learn about 
candidates and assign sets of these attributes to a series of invented candidates. These attributes include 
personal traits, background information, a wide range of issue positions, polls, and endorsements. During 
a DPTE campaign, individual pieces of information scroll down the subject’s computer screen, each 
remaining available for a period of time (in both of these experiments, 12 seconds). As one piece of 
information (an “information box”) moves off of the bottom of the screen, it is replaced by a new piece of 
information at the top of the screen. Each scrolling information box contains a brief synopsis of the 
information provided inside the box (e.g. Patrick Turner’s stance on Education), as well as a small picture 
of the candidate to whom the information refers, and a colored border corresponding to the party of the 
candidate to whom the information refers (red for Republicans, blue for Democrats). When subjects want 
to access the information available in the information box, they click on it, at which point the box expands 
to fill up the entire screen, and allows subjects to read the information available inside. While subjects 
read the information in a particular box, the other pieces of information continue to scroll behind it, so 
they must choose which information is most important for them to learn. Subjects can choose to learn as 
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much, or as little, information as they wish. Because the candidates were invented, participants knew 
nothing about them at the beginning; anything they learned must have come from the information 
available to them in the campaign.  
While dynamic process tracing is often used to examine the amount and type of information that 
subjects search for, it has the added benefit of allowing researchers to present an experimental stimulus 
within a much more realistic information environment than many other survey experiments. Rather than 
presenting subjects with only brief descriptions of, or newspaper articles about, the candidates in our 
experiment, we allow subjects to learn as much information as they choose about each of the candidates. 
Therefore, any effects of candidate gender that we find have been put through a “tough case,” as subjects 
had a wealth of other politically-relevant information to consider when they were making their 
evaluations and vote choices. Particularly in a study like this, where we seek to mimic a complicated 
electoral scenario, DPTE creates a much more realistic environment and, we believe, provides much more 
externally valid results.  
We run similar analyses on both experiments to test our hypotheses. Our dependent variables are 
the feeling thermometer ratings of each subject’s in-party candidate for a particular race and whether they 
voted for their in-party candidate in that race. We focus on evaluations and vote choice for the House of 
Representatives and the presidency, since both of those races appear in both experiments and we expect 
the biggest differences in evaluations between the offices at the top and bottom of the ballot. We use OLS 
regressions to analyze our feeling thermometer scores and logistic regressions to examine the effects of 
our manipulations on in-party vote choice. We use the sex of the in-party candidate in a given race, as 
well as interactions between candidate sex and the number of other women candidates running for other 
offices as our predictors of interest. We also control for other non-relevant manipulations, described in 






Study 1 - DPTE Pilot Experiment 
Sample and Procedure 
The first experiment comes from a pilot DPTE experiment using 279 undergraduate research 
subjects recruited from a large northeastern university.3 Because they were college students, the average 
age of the sample was 22 years old, though ages ranged from 18 through 44. The sample was also 6% 
African American, 15% Hispanic, 58% female and 17% Republican. Subjects participated either as a 
course requirement or to receive extra credit, depending on the course in which they were enrolled. The 
student sample took the experiment in a campus computer lab over a three-week span, and participation 
typically took about 1 hour.4  Additional demographic details about the demographics of the pilot (and 
follow-up) study can be found in the Appendix.  
 
3 Using college students as subjects is always a risky proposition in experimental research and has its 
positives and negatives (Sears 1986).  When looking at strictly cognitive or neurological functions college 
students can often be considered representative of the population as a whole, because such functions are 
typically outside of conscious control and thus factors such as age and experience become irrelevant.  
When asking subjects to make conscious choices, however, including choosing how to search for 
information about political candidates, factors such as age and experience can make a difference. Because 
younger and more educated Americans are less likely to possess gender bias, however, this sample 
presents a “tough case” for finding effects of gender on our dependent variables. We would expect them 
to be more prevalent in more representative samples. 
4 Of those original 279 subjects, data from 12 subjects were eliminated from the final data set; 4 because 
they experienced a “flawed” election4 and 8 because they apparently discovered the ability to access the 
internet from the computers and did not actually participate in the campaign scenario, opening fewer than 
10 information boxes over the course of the 20 minute campaign. 
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Subjects in this experiment experienced either a 2- or 3-race election cycle. Subjects first 
completed a pre-election questionnaire in which they were asked to provide some demographic 
information, as well as various political attitudes. They then viewed a “synopsis page,” which was a 
single screen containing the basic information for the races being contested, including candidate names 
and pictures (which, of course, provided gender cues) and party affiliations. Following this, subjects 
entered a dynamic information board, where boxes containing further information about the candidates 
scrolled in random order down the computer screen. The candidate information in this study was all 
substantive in nature (i.e. it was all designed to convey some policy or background information about one 
of the candidates in the race in a non-biased and non-controversial manner). A full list of the information 
items that subjects could access is available in the appendix.  After 20 minutes, the “campaign” ended, 
and subjects were asked to evaluate the candidates and cast their votes. 
Design 
 The basic design of this experiment systematically varied the number of offices on the ballot, the 
gender of subjects’ in-party candidates for two of the possible offices, and the nature of the information 
environment in the campaign. In each version, a race for the House of Representatives was contested, as 
well as an election for an executive office (either the President or Governor, simulating the difference 
between presidential and midterm cycles). Candidate gender was always manipulated in the House races 
and, while the gender of the subject’s in-party executive candidate was manipulated for subjects who 
experienced a presidential race, the subjects who saw a gubernatorial race instead of a presidential race 
did not receive this manipulation, meaning that only half the sample could have had two women 
candidates campaigning simultaneously. For this reason, our analyses of House candidates utilize a 
sample twice the size of our analyses of presidential candidates. Additionally, some subjects viewed a 
Senate race, varying the total number of campaigns subjects could see between two and three.5  
 
5 These four offices—the House, Senate, President and Governor—were chosen because they are 
typically the most “visible” races on a given ballot, providing voters with the most available information.  
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Candidate gender was manipulated for subjects’ in-party, only, since we expected subjects would 
always be more likely to vote for and care about candidates in their own political parties. The out-party 
candidate was always male, and the information about both candidates was always held constant. That is, 
the information for the Republican candidate was always the same, regardless of whether that candidate 
was in-party or out-party, male or female. The same is true of the Democratic candidate. The only thing 
that changed from condition to condition was the gender of the in-party candidate.  
Manipulating the in-party candidate was meant to ensure that subjects would grapple with any 
gender-based expectations without dismissing women candidates based on political party. A final 
manipulation varied whether subjects saw a campaign information environment that was “realistic” in 
nature, or more egalitarian. In other words, half of the sample saw a campaign in which information about 
presidential candidates was presented more frequently than information about House candidates, 
mimicking real-world campaigns, while the other half experienced a campaign in which the information 
about all candidates was presented with the same frequency. In the equal information condition, subjects 
saw the 25 pieces of information about each candidate in every election scroll by twice. In the realistic 
information condition, information about presidential candidates scrolled by 4 times, while information 
about House candidates only scrolled by once. Because part of our argument rests on the expectation that 
gender will have more influence when less individuating information is available about female 
candidates, we test to see whether having less information available about House candidates (as in the real 
world) alters the relationship between gender and concurrent elections.  
Thus, the study consists of a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design in which the gender of the 
subject’s in-party presidential candidate, the gender of the subject’s House in-party candidate, the total 
number of offices on the ballot, and the nature of the information environment are varied simultaneously. 
The number of women appearing in a subject’s set of campaigns varied from 0 to 2, and women 
candidates were always from the subject’s declared party. Importantly, neither the realistic information 
manipulation nor the number of offices manipulation had an effect on evaluations or vote choice. We 
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include them as controls in our models, but the interaction terms that test their effects on female 
candidates, specifically, have been left out of our final models for the sake of parsimony. 
 
Results 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows our analysis of subjects’ feeling thermometer evaluations for both House and 
Presidential candidates.6 We find support for two of our hypotheses, and possible support for a third. For 
both House and Presidential races, seeing a single woman on the ballot does not affect subjects’ 
evaluations of their in-party candidate (both coefficients are positive and not statistically significant). 
However, the interaction between seeing a woman in the House race and a woman in the presidential race 
is negative and significant for both offices (B=-10.403, p=.56 for the House and B=-14.977, p<.05 for the 
presidency). A difference of 10 and 15 points, respectively, on a 100-point scale is a fairly sizable effect, 
and moves evaluations of female candidates in each race from the high 60s (constant=65.408, p<.001 for 
the House and 68.891, p<.001 for the presidency) to the low to mid 50s. Keep in mind that all of the 
information about these candidates was held constant, and the only gender manipulation was provided via 
pictures that subjects saw when introducing the candidates and that were available during the dynamic 
information board, as well as the candidates’ names. Simply seeing another female candidate running for 
office at the same time provoked a massive change in how our subjects evaluated their in-party House 
candidate when she was also a woman.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
This effect is carried over to the vote choice, though for the House candidate, only (Table 2). We 
find that subjects seeing only an in-party congressional woman candidate were actually more likely to 
 
6 For ease of interpretation we include a list a variables and their correct interpretation in the Appendix. 
Because this study relies on interactions, the coefficients produced are not always directly interpretable as 
marginal effects of the listed variable on the dependent variable, but are often conditional marginal effects 
and contingent upon the value of a third variable. This is explained in Appendix Tables 3 and 4 (Brambor, 
Clark and Golder 2006) 
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vote for her than when the in-party candidate was male (B=1.285, p<.05), but that when a female 
candidate joined her on the ballot for the presidency, these effects were reversed (B=-1.879, p<.10). 
Calculating the predicted probabilities for all of the possible candidate gender permutations (Figure 2) 
reveals that subjects who saw a male candidate from their preferred party in both contests were 80% 
likely to vote for their House candidate. That rose to 86% if a woman ran for the presidency, and rose 
again if the House candidate was a woman and the presidential candidate was a man. However those who 
saw two female candidates had only a 77% chance of voting for their in-party House candidate, a sharp 
decline.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Conclusions from Pilot Study 
Our pilot study largely confirms our expectations. We see that having multiple in-party women 
running for office at the same time produces a backlash from voters. Subjects rate female House 
candidates lower when a woman also runs for president, and are less likely to vote for female House 
candidates in this scenario, as well. Women candidates for president are also rated lower when another 
woman accompanies them on their party’s side of the ballot. This shows clear support for Hypotheses 1 
and 2. It is not clear from these results, though, that these dynamics necessarily affect women candidates 
in certain offices more than others. Women in both House and presidential races are negatively affected 
when other women appear on the ballot in terms of evaluation, but the only evidence that this affects 
ultimate vote outcomes occurs at the House level. Even though subjects like female presidential 
candidates less when they run alongside another woman, other considerations seem to be winning out 
when they actually cast a vote. This may be evidence that candidates for lower office are more susceptible 
to gender dynamics than those for higher office (possible support for Hypothesis 3), or it may simply be 
that the smaller sample size for the presidential analysis led to non-significant findings. We take up this 
question again in Study 2.   
Study 2 - DPTE Follow-up Study 
Sample and Procedure 
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The second data source comes from another DPTE experiment, which recruited 431 online adult 
subjects through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).7 MTurk provides a good follow-up to our student 
sample in Study 1, as it allows for a different and more diverse (though not representative) sample with 
which to test our theory. While some concerns about the use of MTurk for political experiments have 
been raised, most evidence suggests that findings from MTurk studies do not differ in important ways 
from those conducted on other kinds of samples (See Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman and Freese, 2016; 
Clifford, Jewel and Waggoner 2015; Berinsky, et al 2012; Weinberg et al, 2014; Buhrmester, Kwang and 
Gosling 2011; Paolacci, et al; Crump et al 2013, but see Kahan 2013 and Krupnikov, and Levine 2014 for 
evidence to the contrary). Further, many concerns about MTurk sample demographics center around the 
fact that MTurkers tend to be more liberal and Democratic than nationally representative samples 
(Berinksy, et al 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015), which can pose a problem for certain kinds of studies. In 
the case of gender, a more liberal/Democratic sample presents a tougher case than one that is more 
conservative, as conservatives are more likely to hold traditional views on gender, and Republican women 
tend to fare worse than Democrats (King and Matland 2003; Dolan 2010). Finally, several studies have 
found similar stereotyping effects between MTurk samples and the general population (Craig and 
Richeson, 2014; Crawford, Brady, Pilanski, and Erny, 2013; Crawford and Pilanski, 2013; Hopkins, 
2014). 
Each respondent was paid $4 for participating in an approximately 45-minute experiment that 
simulated a presidential election cycle while varying the number of other offices appearing on the ballot 
simultaneously. All of the Mechanical Turk subjects took the experiment on their own computers, and it 
took us 3 days to recruit our subject pool. This sample had a median age was 35, was 25% Republican, 
55% male, 4% African American and 6% Hispanic (more on the demographics of the sample can be 





Subjects experienced the same procedure as those who participated in the pilot study. They first 
completed a pre-election questionnaire, which collected data on demographic characteristics and political 
attitudes, then saw a “synopsis page” which presented them with the candidates they would be asked to 
consider. After viewing this page, they entered the dynamic information board where they were able to 
click on as many of the scrolling boxes as they chose. A total of 20 boxes were available about each 
candidate and the campaign lasted up to 35 minutes. After experiencing the campaign, subjects were 
asked to cast a vote for the candidate of their choice in each race and evaluate the various candidates. 
Design 
In our 2nd study, we alter our political environment to allow two candidates for up to four offices 
to campaign simultaneously. We do this by constructing a stacked manipulation in which all of our 
subjects saw a contest between major party presidential candidates, with 25% also saw a House race run 
concurrently, 25% saw both the House and a Senate race, and a further 25% saw the full complement of 
presidential, House, Senate and Governor races. In each of these races, both the Democrat and the 
Republican had a 50% chance of being a woman, meaning that subjects could see as many as 8 women 
candidates, or as few as 0, and those candidates could appear in either their in- and out-party. This is a 
major difference from the first study, when only the in-party candidates could be women. Again, every 
piece of information of the candidates remained the same, except for their gender. They were otherwise 
designed to be very typical Democratic or Republican candidates for office. This provides a full (and as of 
yet not seen in reality) dynamic environment in which to examine how the sex of candidates influences 
voter behavior. As before, the only factor that changed between subjects in regards to the candidate was 
whether they were given a male or female name and picture, while all other information about the 
candidates remained static between subjects.  
We constructed this experiment in such a way that we are able to replicate our earlier analyses for 
House and presidential candidates. We ran similar analyses for Senate and gubernatorial candidates in this 
study, since candidate gender also varied in these offices, and found a similar though non-significant 
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pattern of results, suggesting that candidates at the top and bottom of a ticket may be affected by gender 
dynamics more than those in the middle. We present our results for House and Presidency below. 
Results 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 displays our results for the feeling thermometer evaluations of in-party congressional and 
presidential candidates, and again supports our expectations. We find that candidate sex does affect how 
subjects evaluate those candidates, though this time for House candidates, only. Women House 
candidates, when running as the only woman from their party, actually receive a boost, gaining 
approximately 10.5 thermometer points over identical male in-party candidates (b=10.571, p<.05). As in 
Study 1, though, when other women candidates also run within the subject’s party, thermometer ratings 
for the female House candidate plummet by nearly 5.5 points for each in-party woman appearing 
simultaneously (b=-5.491, p<.05). In this scenario, as many as three additional women could appear as in-
party candidates, translating into a maximum decrease of almost 17 thermometer points for a 
congressional woman candidate. Considering that the in-party House candidates typically had 
thermometer ratings in the low 70s, this reduction is severe, and turned good ratings for a candidate into 
rather poor scores.  
Unlike Study 1, we do not find significant effects for the presidential candidate’s feeling 
thermometer scores here, though the direction of the coefficients remains in the expected direction. This 
may be further evidence that the gender composition of an election cycle has a greater effect on lower-
level candidates than those at the top of the ticket. 
  [Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 4 shows the results of our vote choice analysis for Study 2. Again, the pattern of results is 
the same, though  only one of the results reaches statistical significance – the number of In-Party Female 
Candidates. As a conditional marginal effect, this tells us that, for men in-party House candidates, as the 
number of women in-party candidates in other races increases, the likelihood of that man receiving the 
vote of a partisan supporter also increases. Figure 3 charts the predicted probabilities for the likelihood of 
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voting for an in-party man, depending on how many women are seen running for other offices. With no 
women on the ballot alongside him, men are about 80% likely to win the vote. But as more women run 
concurrently, it becomes increasingly likely that he will win the vote, peaking here at 97% when three 
women run! 
  [Insert Figure 3 here] 
Out-Party Candidate Gender 
One possible explanation for why many of the results in Tables 3 and 4 are not significant, while 
the previous study did return significant results, is the gender difference that we allowed in the out-party 
candidates. Unlike the pilot study, where subjects always saw men running as the out-party candidate, 
Study 2 allows the out-party candidate’s gender to vary. Implicitly, our theory suggests that women 
candidates will do worse when compared or evaluated against men, but it could be that when they are 
compared to out-party women these effects are attenuated. The simplest way to check this is to rerun the 
regressions for study two, restricting the samples based upon the sex of the out-party candidates.8 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions on in-party feeling thermometer scores when the 
samples are divided into those who saw out-party men and those who saw out-party women. The results 
are quite different. In the out-party women sample, none of the variables of interest are significant in 
either regression, and the magnitude of the coefficients is generally quite small. In the out-party men 
condition, however, the magnitude of coefficients is quite large, and significant for our key variables. For 
house candidates, all of the variables of interest reach statistical significance, even though the sample size 
is cut in half from Table 3. The magnitude of effects also clearly spikes, indicating that candidates are 
strongly influenced by the overall electoral context.  
For instance, the interaction between having a in-party woman candidate for the House, and the 
number of in-party women running in other offices is strong and negative (-10.333, sig p<.01). Given that 
 
8 This can also be accomplished by using interactions, but restricting the samples permits an easier 
comparison and much easier interpretation of results.  
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there are three other offices, this means that a woman running for Congress might be downgraded by over 
30 points on the 100-point feeling thermometer, simply based upon who else is running in other offices – 
something she has no control over. Granted, these results do show that women House candidates do start 
out with an 18-point benefit over their male counterparts, when no other women are on the ballot 
(“Female In-Party House Candidate”). However, as the number of in-party female candidates increase, 
male candidates are upgraded by over 6-points for each woman they see (“Number of In-Party Female 
Candidates” reports this, as the interaction variable reports the effect when the in-party candidate is a 
woman). So while House women candidates are punished when other women run, House men candidates 
benefit! 
The results for women presidential candidates is not so stark. Individual presidential women 
benefit by a 10-point bump when the out-party candidate is a man, but the negative effect of other women 
on the ballot is not statistically significant, and one-third the strength of the congressional version (-3 vs. -
10). We take this as confirmation of our expectation that the effects of having multiple women on the 
ballot are felt more strongly by the lower office candidates.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 Turning to Table 6, and the logistic regressions for vote choice, we find much the same pattern. 
When the out-party candidate is a woman, there are no significant effects for also having an in-party 
woman candidate in either the House race or the presidential race, nor significant interactions with the 
number of other women on the ballot. Further, when the out-party candidate is a man, the effect of the 
congressional or presidential candidate being a woman is also not significant, indicating that women in 
these offices do not significantly differ from men in their likelihood of receiving the vote of their in-party 
supporters, when other women do not appear on the ballot. , However, men and women’s fates differ 
based upon who runs in other races, with men receiving a positive coefficient for in-party women running 
(0.931, p<.10), and women receiving a negative coefficient (-1.228, p<.10).  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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 Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities for men and women House candidates’ receiving the 
vote of their in-party supporters, based simply upon the gender composition of the rest of the other races 
on the ballot. The patterns are obvious – men’s chances improve, while women’s chances decline as more 
women run for other offices.  Figure 5, below, supports this general assertion by plotting the predicted 
probabilities for the presidential candidate when she is a woman. It again shows that when more women 
appear on the ballot, the likelihood of a supporter voting for her drops precipitously, in this case from 
98% to just 74%. 
Conclusions from Study 2 
Our second experiment largely confirms our expectations and our previous findings. In terms of 
candidate evaluation, female congressional candidates do just as well as, or even have an advantage over 
their male counterparts as long as she is the only woman that subjects are asked to consider. As soon as 
other in-party women are added to the ballot, their evaluations decrease dramatically in relation to 
identical male candidates. Importantly, her evaluations decreased linearly9 with each new woman that 
appeared on the ballot, suggesting that it is not just the appearance of other women generally that leads to 
lower evaluations, but that she does progressively worse as more women appear in the electoral 
environment. Conversely, men running for the House do better when more women appear in other races, 
boosting their electoral fortunes. This suggests that election scenarios which move closer to gender parity 
may actually be detrimental for women running for Congress (or those in the lowest office on the ballot), 
even while being a positive accomplishment normatively and descriptively.  
 It is unclear why the vote choice results for female presidential candidates reach statistical 
significance while the results for the feeling thermometer score do not. It is important to note, however, 
that the pattern of results is the same for all of our analyses in both experiments. Coefficients for female 
candidates in both offices are positive when no other women run concurrently. As soon as any other 
women are added to the ballot, though, coefficients become negative. Examining two different offices, in 
 
9 These results from the OLS analysis are replicated when plotting estimated means from both ANOVA 
and GLM analyses.  
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two different studies, using two different types of samples we find nearly identical patterns emerge in the 
data. Candidate sex matters, and the gender composition of the entire ballot affects individual candidates 
on the top and bottom of that ballot. 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
 Our analyses provide evidence that the number of women participating as candidates in 
concurrent elections has implications for the women in those races, as does the office for which they are 
running. Our results indicate that women running for Congress, in particular, seem to be disadvantaged 
and subject to more negative evaluations when other women are simultaneously running for higher office. 
Women candidates for the House are less likely to receive votes from members of their in-party and 
receive lower feeling thermometer ratings when the subject also sees other in-party women running for 
higher offices. Our expectation is that the effects demonstrated here are not limited to Congress, per se, 
but would theoretically continue down the ballot, serving as an obstacle to women running for all types of 
lower offices, assuming women appear in races for higher offices. A test of this broader hypothesis would 
involve analyzing state legislative races, or other statewide executive offices, but we currently lack the 
data necessary to do so.  
Considering that we are currently witnessing our first presidential major-party run for a female 
candidate, our findings give us pause. While a female major-party presidential nominee (and possible 
president) signifies incredible progress for women in politics, our findings suggest that such a candidacy 
may not be a universal benefit to all women candidates. If a woman candidate breaks the glass ceiling of 
presidential politics, our findings suggest that lower-office candidates may be punished, either through 
more negative evaluations or lost votes. 2016 will likely provide the first opportunity to examine this 
possibility in the real world and we hope that we, or others, will do so. 
Importantly, though, the story we find here is not universally dour. Our findings do suggest that 
women candidates who appear on the ballot by themselves often have an advantage over their male 
counterparts. In effect, we find support for the adage “when women run, women win,” but with an 
important caveat.  Women can run, and they can win, provided they are running as the only woman on a 
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ballot. However, there does seem to be a “ceiling effect” in terms of the number of women voters want to 
have representing them at once, or at least are comfortable seeing on the ballot. Based on our data, we can 
only speculate as to why this is, but it is probable that the juxtaposition of gender stereotypes with 
expectations about what constitutes a “normal” candidate (i.e. being white and male, among other things) 
or an effective leader, in general, is part of the explanation. The fact that lower-level candidates seem to 
be most affected by the overall gender composition of an election cycle is also suggestive that stereotypes 
are part of the problem here, since we would expect candidates who have a harder time getting 
information about themselves out to voters would be more subject to stereotyping. When voters take the 
time to learn about candidates, this allows them to become familiar with them and see that they are not so 
novel, but are in fact normal. This takes effort however, and voters do not expend effort equally upon all 
offices, or all candidates.  
Our findings speak to the larger literature on gender stereotypes, as well, in that they lend more 
support to studies that have argued that gender stereotypes play an important role in particular electoral 
contexts (e.g. Bauer 2015; Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister 2011). Recent studies that have found little 
effect of gender stereotypes on the fortunes of women candidates (e.g. Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; Hayes 
2015) do not take into account the ways in which subtle differences in campaigns and elections can 
change the ways in/extent to which voters employ stereotypes in their voting calculus. We believe that 
our study adds to the literature advocating a “middle ground” when it comes to gender stereotypes and 
voting. That is, our findings suggest that we cannot assume a woman candidate will always be 
disadvantaged by gender-based stereotypes. In fact, we find the opposite when a woman runs as the only 
woman. However, our findings also suggest that we cannot rule out the importance of gender stereotypes, 
wholesale, since they do seem to matter when multiple women run at the same time.  
We further believe that our findings may shed more light on why women continue to be under-
represented in politics. Women, by and large, have been increasing descriptive representation from the 
bottom-up. Women hold state legislative offices at higher rates than federal legislative offices, and (until 
recently) have been better represented in the House than in the Senate. Based on our results, it is possible 
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that part of the explanation as to why there has been such slow progress is that, as one woman blazes a 
path into higher office, her advancement impedes the advancement of other woman running for other, 
lower offices, This, we believe, happens state by state, and office by office. As more women are 
successful in winning election to higher and higher offices, we believe that this will continue to change 
the perception that white, male candidates are the norm in those offices. The path towards parity will 
likely be a slow, non-linear one, then, but we hope that the negative effects of multiple women running 
for office are temporary and will be alleviated through the steady increase of women who campaign for 
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Table 1.  














Variables    
Constant 
65.408***      
(2.607) 
 





-1.094           
(2.354) 
 












-1.947          
(2.347) 
 






1.456        
(2.686) 
 




Female In-Party  
Presidential Candidate 
-4.424         
(4.338) 
 






-10.403†        
(5.443) 
 




R-Squared 0.029 0.056  
N 261 130  
 





Table 2.  






Presidential   
In-Party Vote 
Choice  
Variables B B 
Constant 
2.220***     
(0.492) 
 




-0.040        
(0.450) 
 











-0.891†          
(0.471) 
 





1.285*        
(0.572) 
 
0.505           
(0.726) 
 
Female In-Party  
Presidential Candidate 
0.413          
(0.803) 
 





-1.879†                  
(0.977) 
 
-0.011       
(0.998) 
 
R-Squared 0.066 0.015 
 
N 261 131 
 
 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 3.  













Variables   
Constant 
50.773***   
(4.242) 
 
56.076***          
(3.177) 
 
Strength of Party ID 
7.573***      
(1.538) 
 




0.617          
(2.742) 
 




-0.037           
(2.865) 
 
3.434        
(0.583) 
 




0.137           
(.933) 
 
Female In-Party House Candidate 





Female House Candidate X Number Female 
Candidates 
















R-Squared 0.083 0.075 
N 276 352 
 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 31 
Table 4.  








Vote Choice  





1.231*          
(.608) 
 








-0.337          
(0.554) 
 




-0.416           
(0.532) 
 
-0.248        
(0.518) 
 




0.174          
(0.323) 
 
























R-Squared 0.038 0.032 














Table 5.  
OLS Regressions for Feeling Thermometers, Study 2 
 





















Variables     
Constant 
54.371***   
(5.974) 
57.919***    
(4.496) 
49.320***   
(6.099) 
 
53.886***          
(4.555) 
 
Strength of Party ID 
8.245***   
(2.089) 
7.062***    
(1.815) 
6.287**    
(2.287) 
 




4.724      
(3.843) 
-1.867       
(3.271) 
-2.331    
(3.970) 
 




-3.716        
(4.094) 
0.459        
(3.649) 
3.192      
(4.007) 
 
6.885†        
(3.848) 
 
Number of In-Party 
Female Candidates 
-2.132     
(3.003) 
1.689        
(2.461) 
6.192*      
(2.638) 
 





2.326       
(6.364) 






Candidate X Number 
Female Candidates 
0.196       
(3.509) 







- 0.169       





Candidate X Number 
Female Candidates 
- -2.378      




R-Squared 0.093 0.057 0.090 0.085 
N 139 172 137 180 
 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 6.  
Logistic Regressions for In-Party Vote Choice, Study 2 
 
 Facing Out-Party Woman Facing Out-Party Man 
 
Congressional 
In-Party    
Vote Choice  
Presidential   
In-Party           
Vote Choice 
Congressional 
In-Party   
Vote Choice  
Presidential 






2.215†       
(1.288)  
2.224*     
(0.899) 
0.497     
(1.103) 
 
0.274     
(0.865) 
 
Strength of Party ID 
0.386       
(0.432) 
0.056       
(0.368) 
0.538       
(0.469) 
 




0.086     
(0.818) 
0.041       
(0.707) 
-0.519         
(0.810) 
 




-0.655      
(0.824) 
-0.789        
(0.690) 
-0.284     
(0.720) 
 
0.352        
(0.825) 
 
Number of In-Party 
Female Candidates 
0.283      
(0.749) -0.181        
(0.439) 
0.931†     
(0.501) 
 





-1.336      
(1.308) --  






Candidate X Number 
Female Candidates 
-0.025     
(0.828) --  









0.380       
(1.037) --  








0.045       
(0.553) --  
-1.380*    
(0.616) 
 
R-Squared 0.052 0.030 0.087 0.075 
N 139 172 137 276 
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Appendix Table 1. Information Items Available about the Candidates, by Study 
 
Pilot (25) Study 2 (20) 
Abortion Abortion 
Affirmative Action   
  Afghanistan 
Campaign Slogan   
Current Job Performance   
  Crime 
Debate Performance Debate Performance 
Defense Budget Defense Budget 
Economic Philosophy   
Editorial Comments Editorial Comments 
Education Education 
Education Stance Education Policy 
Energy Stance Energy Stance 
Family Family 
  Global Warming 
  Gun Control 
Healthcare Healthcare 
  Immigration 
Jobs/Unemployment Jobs/Unemployment 
Military Experience   
Military Intervention   
Mother's Anecdote   
Picture   
Political Experience Political Experience 
Religion Religion 
Social/Political Philosophy   
Taxes Taxes 
Terrorism  Terrorism 
Welfare Welfare 





Appendix Table 2: Demographics of the Two Studies 
 




% Female 57.7% 58.6% 
% Hispanic 15.4% 5.7% 
% Black 6.4% 4.5% 
Mean Age 21.8 34.6 
% Democrat 67.4% 59.2% 
% Republican 22.5% 24.8% 
Mean IP 
House Therm 64.79 70.2 
Mean IP Pres 
Therm 
70.72 
(N=130) 70.9  
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Explanation of Variables in Pilot Study 
Variable Interpretation Values 




The marginal effect of having the 





The marginal effect of having a realistic 
availability of information, rather than an 
equal distribution between the offices 
0, 1 
 
Female In-Party House Candidate 
The conditional marginal effect of having 
an in-party woman candidate for the 
House, rather than a man, when the in-
party candidate for the executive is a man 
0, 1 
 
Female In-Party  Presidential 
Candidate 
The conditional marginal effect of having 
an in-party woman candidate for the 
President, rather than a man, when the in-
party candidate for the House is a man 
0, 1 
 
Multiple In-Party Women 
The conditional marginal effect of having 
in-party women candidates run for both 
House and President, rather than not 







Appendix Table 4: Explanation of Variables in Study 2 
 
Variable Interpretation Values 
Strength of Party ID The marginal effect of Strength of Partisanship 
0, 1, 2, 3 
Senate Race The marginal effect of having a Senate race appear, rather than not appear 
0, 1 
Governor Race The marginal effect of having a Governor race appear, rather than not appear 
0, 1 
Number of In-Party Female 
Candidates 
The conditional marginal effect of having an 
additional in-party women candidate appear 
when the in-party House/Presidential 
candidate is a man 
0, 1, 2, 3 
Female In-Party House Candidate 
The conditional marginal effect of having an 
in-party woman House candidate, rather 
than a man, when no other in-party women 
appear 
0, 1 
Female House Candidate X Number 
Female Candidates 
The conditional marginal effect of having an 
additional in-party women candidate appear 
when the in-party House candidate is a 
woman 
0, 1, 2, 3 
Female In-Party Presidential 
Candidate 
The conditional marginal effect of having an 
in-party woman Presidential candidate, 
rather than a man, when no other in-party 
women appear  
0, 1 
Female Presidential Candidate X 
Number Female Candidates 
The conditional marginal effect of having an 
additional in-party women candidate appear 
when the in-party Presidential candidate is a 
woman  
0, 1, 2, 3 
 
